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Abstract
Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly 
two theses: (I) the theory of meaning has a central position in phi-
losophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic 
analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical 
issues; (II) the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will 
defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an impor-
tant lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic 
competence and semantics, which I take to be an important part of 
Dummett’s legacy in philosophy of language. I discuss this point in rela-
tion to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Arguments.
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1 Dummett’s legacy: semantics and metaphysics
Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett never gave 
up two main theses:
(I) The theory of meaning has a central and foundational place in 
philosophy.
(II) The theory of meaning is a theory of understanding.
Thesis (I) is the climax of the linguistic turn started with Frege and 
adopted later by logical positivists. It is the view that metaphysical 
issues must be resolved, or dissolved, by recourse to the theory of 
meaning. Contrary to positivists, who dismissed metaphysical issues 
either as nonsense or as issues concerning no matters of fact and re-
ducible to pragmatic choices between different languages, Dummett 
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reinterpreted metaphysical disputes as disputes concerning the truth 
conditions of sentences.1 Whether one is justified to be a realist in 
some area of discourse depends on whether one is justified to assign 
realist truth conditions to sentences in that area of discourse, i.e. bi-
valent, epistemically transcendent truth conditions. Linguistic cate-
gories are also the starting point for the analysis of formal ontological 
notions. For example, the formal notion of object is to be understood 
in terms of the notion of reference of singular terms—with the no-
tion of singular term to be explained on the basis of characteristic 
behaviour in syntactic and logical operations on sentences containing 
singular terms.2 Dummett gave the philosophy of language a foun-
dational role. If metaphysical issues are reformulated as questions 
about the structure and content of language, only the philosophy of 
language can provide the analysis of such structure.
Nowadays many, perhaps most, philosophers reject the founda-
tional role of the philosophy of language and claim a substantive and 
autonomous role for metaphysics. They regard metaphysics as that 
part of the philosophical inquiry that is engaged to discover objec-
tive characteristics of reality and not the fundamental features of our 
thought about reality.
Thesis (II) is also central in Dummett’s philosophy and struggle 
against semantic realism. According to Dummett, the theory of 
meaning must be tripartite in (a) a theory of reference, (b) a theory of 
sense and (c) a theory of force.3 The theory of reference determines 
recursively the conditions for the application to each sentence of that 
notion which is understood as the central notion in the explanation 
1 See Dummett 1978: xl: ‘The whole point of my approach to these problems 
[the disputes concerning realism] has been to show that the theory of meaning 
underlies metaphysics. If I have made any worthwhile contribution to philosophy, 
I think it must lie in having raised this issue in these terms.’
2 See Dummett 1981. For a discussion of this point, see Wright 1983:53-64.
3 See Dummett 1976: 127: ‘Any theory of meaning was early seen as falling 
into three parts: the first, the core theory, the theory of reference; secondly, its 
shell, the theory of sense; and thirdly, the supplementary part of the theory of 
meaning, the theory of force... The theory of reference determines recursively 
the application to each sentence of that notion which is taken as central in the 
given theory of meaning... The theory of sense specifies what is involved in at-
tributing to a speaker a knowledge of the theory of reference.’
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of meaning. The theory of sense specifies what is involved in ascrib-
ing the knowledge of the theory of reference to speakers. The theory 
of sense is a theory of understanding that specifies that in which the 
knowledge of the theory of reference consists.4 As the knowledge of 
the theory of reference is an implicit form of knowledge, the theory 
of sense must correlate the knowledge of each theorem of the theory 
of reference with a practical linguistic ability.5 Dummett’s criticism 
of semantic realism is that the classical notion of truth cannot serve 
as the central notion in the explanation of meaning, since it makes 
it impossible to construct a proper theory of sense. This is to say 
that one cannot specify what is involved in ascribing to speakers the 
implicit knowledge of the theorems of a classical two-valued seman-
tics, which assigns epistemically transcendent truth conditions to 
sentences.
Dummett’s argument against semantic realism is known as The 
Manifestation Argument and has the form of a reductio:6
1. Knowledge of meaning is knowledge of classical truth 
conditions.
2. Knowledge of meaning consists in the capacity to recognize, if 
appropriately placed, whether or not truth conditions obtain.
3. Classical truth conditions are such that, if actualized, they 
need not be recognizably so.
4. Knowledge of meaning is not knowledge of classical truth 
conditions.
4 See Dummett 1975: 99: ‘A theory of meaning is a theory of understanding.’
5 See Dummett 1976: 72: ‘We may therefore require that the implicit knowl-
edge which he [the speaker] has of the theorems of the theory of meaning which 
relate to whole sentences be explained in terms of his ability to employ those 
sentences in particular ways... The ascription to him of a grasp of the axioms gov-
erning the words is a means of representing his derivation of the meaning of each 
sentence from the meanings of its component words, but his knowledge of the 
axioms need not be manifested in anything but the employment of the sentence.’
6 I borrow this presentation of the manifestation argument from Tennant 
(1987).
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According to premise 2, every speaker who knows the meaning of a 
sentence S must be able to recognize that its classical truth conditions 
obtain whenever they obtain. But S’s classical truth conditions might ob-
tain without being it possible to know that this is so. Therefore, there 
is no guarantee that the knowledge of S’s meaning consists in a capacity 
that can be ever exercised. This is an absurd consequence, since to have 
a capacity is to be able to do something that can be done. Nobody pos-
sesses a capacity to do anything that cannot be done. Dummett drew the 
conclusion 4, which is the negation of premise 1, i.e. of semantic realism.
The argument rests on premise 2, which is a consequence of thesis 
(II). Thesis (II) is known as the manifestation constraint and is Dummett’s 
explication of Wittgenstein’s slogan that meaning is use. It expresses the 
view that the theory of meaning must include the theory of sense, which 
specifies that in which the knowledge of meaning consists.7 Dummett 
said that a theory that meets the manifestation constraint specifies not 
only what speakers know, when they know the meanings of the expres-
sions of the language they speak, but also that in which such knowledge 
consists, in such a way that one would acquire the knowledge of the 
meanings of the expressions of the language under study, were one 
taught the practical abilities that the theory of sense is called to describe. 
The manifestation constraint has a constitutive import. It regards lin-
guistic behaviour as something in need of analysis. Linguistic behaviour 
is analysed in order to determine the complex of linguistic abilities that 
constitute the mastery of the language. To know that a certain expres-
sion has a certain meaning is to be able to make a certain use of that ex-
pression and the theory of meaning must describe such patterns of use.
Some philosophers have rejected Dummett’s Manifestation Argu-
ment by rejecting thesis (II), with its constitutive significance. They hold 
that the ascription of the implicit knowledge of the theory, which for each 
sentence specifies its classical truth-conditions, amounts to the ascription 
7 See, for example, Dummett 1977: 376: ‘An argument of this kind is based 
upon a fundamental principle, which may be stated briefly, in Wittgensteinian 
terms, as the principle that a grasp of the meaning of an expression must be 
exhaustively manifested by the use of that expression and hence must constitute 
implicit knowledge of its contribution to determining the condition for the truth 
of a sentence in which it occurs; and an ascription of implicit knowledge must al-
ways be explainable in terms of what counts as a manifestation of that knowledge, 
namely the possession of some practical capacity.’
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of internal states and allows for testable predictions about speakers’ lin-
guistic behaviour. They reject Dummett’s manifestation constraint that 
semantics (theory of reference)—the core part of the theory of mean-
ing—must be associated with a theory of understanding—the theory of 
sense—that provides an analysis of linguistic behaviour that isolates the 
patterns of linguistic abilities that constitute the implicit knowledge of the 
semantic theory.8
I will not defend Dummett’s theses (I) and (II). I agree that there is 
a division in the philosophical labour between metaphysicians and phi-
losophers of language, and that the philosophy of language does not have 
a foundational role in respect of other philosophical fields. I also agree 
that the Manifestation Argument can be blocked by rejecting the con-
stitutive constraint. However, I will argue that there is a constraint that 
makes the link between linguistic competence and semantics more inti-
mate than some philosophers believe. I take this constraint to be part of 
Dummett’s legacy in the philosophy of language. I will address the point 
by discussing Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Argu-
ments. I will claim that despite the fact that they recognize a division 
in the philosophical labour between metaphysicians and philosophers 
of language, their criticism of Incompleteness Arguments is mistakenly 
grounded on an underestimation of the connection between linguistic 
competence and semantics.9
8 Dummett goes on to argue that classical semantics is not adequate because 
there are no linguistic abilities that constitute implicit knowledge of epistemically 
transcendent truth conditions. See Dummett 1991: 303: ‘A semantic theory may 
be criticised on the ground that it cannot be extended to a coherent or workable 
meaning-theory at all; and since, by definition, a semantic theory can be so ex-
tended, this criticism amounts to saying that it is not, after all, a genuine semantic 
theory.’
9 It is worth noticing that I will not draw any conclusion against classical 
bivalent semantics. To the extent that I defend the Incompleteness Arguments 
against Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism, I draw a conclusion against Minimalism 
in semantics, and in favor of Contextualism. I mention Dummett’s view to ar-
gue that theoretical reflections on speakers’ linguistic competence and linguistic 
practice put some constraints on semantics and that Minimalism does not satisfy 
such constraints. In this paper I use ‘Minimalism’ in the same sense as Cappelen 
and Lepore (2005: 1) use it. On Cappelen and Lepore’s view there are few ex-
pressions that are context sensitive, and such expressions belong to the Basic Set of 
genuinely context sensitive expressions: indexicals (‘I’), demonstratives (‘that’), 
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2 Incompleteness arguments
Contextualists employ Incompleteness Arguments to maintain that 
certain expressions are context sensitive. Consider the following 
sentence:
(1) Bradley is tall.
An Incompleteness Argument starts from the premise that if one 
takes (1) in isolation from the information available in the context of 
utterance, then one is unable to truth evaluate (1). It is only if one 
takes account of contextual information that utterances of (1) are 
truth evaluable. For example, in the course of a conversation about 
the physical characteristics of presidential candidates, the utterance 
of (1) is true if and only if Bradley is 180 cm tall or over, i.e. tall in 
respect of the average height of the presidential candidates. Whereas 
in the course of a conversation about great NBA centers, the utter-
ance of (1) is true if and only if Bradley is 205 cm tall or over, i.e. tall 
in respect of the average height of great NBA centers. This line of 
reasoning leads to the conclusion that there is no invariant proposi-
tion, i.e. the proposition that Bradley is tall simpliciter, which utter-
ances of (1) express in all contexts. On the other hand, one has the 
intuition that there are both the proposition that Bradley is tall as 
compared with the class of the candidates to the presidency and the 
proposition that Bradley is tall as compared with the class of great 
NBA centers, which are the propositions expressed by utterances 
of (1) with the help of the information available in the context of 
utterance. In general, then, a successful Incompleteness Argument 
gives evidence that there is no invariant proposition that a sentence S 
expresses in all contexts of utterance. If, in addition, this conclusion 
adverbs (‘here’), adjectives (‘actual’) and contextuals (‘enemy’). All semantic 
context sensitivity is grammatically (i.e. syntactically or morphemically) trig-
gered. I use the term ‘Contextualism’ in a very broad sense which comprehends 
indexicalism à la Stanley (2007), according to which the Basic Set of genuinely 
context sensitive expressions is much larger than Cappelen and Lepore think, 
but all context sensitivity is linguistically triggered (in the logical form if not in 
the grammatical form) and pragmatism à la Carston (2002), Travis (2008), Re-
canati (2011), according to which the Basic Set is even larger and not all context 
sensitivity is linguistically triggered, but a large part of it involves free pragmatic 
processes.
213Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence 
is accompanied with the intuition that in each context of utterance S 
expresses a truth evaluable content relative to the contextual infor-
mation, then an inference to the best explanation of that intuition 
leads to the conclusion that S (some expressions occurring in it) is 
context sensitive. For example, the intuition that the truth condi-
tions of (1) and the propositions expressed by it vary, when the con-
texts of utterance vary, is explained within a theory that treats ‘tall’ 
as a context sensitive expression.
3 Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of incompleteness arguments
Cappelen and Lepore (2005) reject Incompleteness Arguments be-
cause, in their view, arguments of that kind aim at establishing a 
metaphysical conclusion about the existence of entities that might 
figure as constituents of propositions, like the property of being tall 
simpliciter, on the basis of psychological data. Psychological data, how-
ever, have no bearing on metaphysical issues. Cappelen and Lepore 
say that typically an incompleteness argument amounts to the fol-
lowing claim:
Consider the alleged proposition that P that some sentence S semanti-
cally expresses. Intuitively, the world can’t just be P simpliciter. The 
world is neither P nor not P. There’s no such thing as P’s being the case 
simpliciter. And so, there is no such proposition.
So, for example, consider ‘Al is ready’. Some authors contend that it 
is just plain obvious that there isn’t any such thing as Al’s being ready 
simpliciter. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 11)
Their presentation of incompleteness claims has unequivocally a 
metaphysical import. Cappelen and Lepore argue that those phi-
losophers, who make use of Incompleteness Arguments to support 
Contextualism, are guilty of conflating metaphysical issues with lin-
guistic ones. The data about speakers’ dispositions to truth evaluate 
sentences in their contexts of utterance might be revelatory about 
psychological facts and facts about communication, but have no 
weight for metaphysical inquiries on what entities exist.
I claim that Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness 
Arguments reveals their misunderstanding of the real nature of such 
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arguments and, consequently, their underestimation of the real force 
of the arguments of that kind. Consider Taylor’s illustration of an 
incompleteness argument. Discussing the structure of the semantic 
content of utterances of (2):
(2) It is raining.
Taylor says:10
[(2)] is missing no syntactic sentential constituent, nonetheless, it is 
semantically incomplete. The semantic incompleteness is manifest to 
us as a felt inability to evaluate the truth value of an utterance of [(2)] in 
the absence of a contextually provided location (or range of locations). 
This felt need for a contextually provided location has its source, I 
claim, in our tacit cognition of the syntactically unexpressed argument 
place of the verb ‘to rain’. (Taylor 2001: 61)
Leaving aside Taylor’s own view about the semantics of the verb ‘to 
rain’, which goes along the lines of the Hidden Indexical Theory, Tay-
lor’s idea of incompleteness is that if a sentence gives rise to a felt 
inability to truth evaluate its utterances independently of contextual 
information, then the sentence contains some context sensitive ex-
pressions. As said above, Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism is that an 
argument such as Taylor’s must be rejected because psychological 
facts about how speakers feel about the truth evaluation of sentences 
have no weight on metaphysical questions about what entities exist.
4 The real goal of incompleteness arguments
I will not raise questions about the truth of Cappelen and Lepore’s 
claim that psychological facts have no bearing on metaphysical ques-
tions. I will argue, instead, that the truth of this claim is beside the 
point, because an incompleteness claim is not a metaphysical claim 
on the existence of this or that entity. Incompleteness Arguments do 
10 The quotation from Taylor serves to highlight the idea that an incomplete-
ness argument starts from a premise that registers the speakers’ felt inability to 
truth evaluate some utterances independently of contextual information. Noth-
ing in the quotation from Taylor gives evidence in favour of Cappelen and Lepore’s 
reading of Incompleteness Arguments according to which a metaphysical conclu-
sion about the existence of certain entities follows from that premise.
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not provide evidence against the existence of certain entities, which 
might figure as constituents of propositions, but against the idea 
that such entities, if any, can be semantically associated with words 
as their semantic contents. I hold that an incompleteness claim is a 
significant claim in respect of linguistic competence and theoreti-
cal considerations about linguistic competence do have consequences 
for semantics (so I will argue). For example, the conclusion of an 
incompleteness argument concerning the adjective ‘tall’11 is not that 
the property of being tall simpliciter does not exist, because speak-
ers are unable to truth evaluate the sentence (1) independently of 
contextual information. One might agree with Cappelen and Lepore 
that the existence and possibly the account of the property of being 
tall simpliciter is a matter for metaphysicians not for philosophers of 
language. I claim that the conclusion of the incompleteness argu-
ment is that a semantic theory, which assigned the property of being 
tall simpliciter to the adjective ‘tall’ as its semantic value, would be 
incompatible with any account of linguistic competence, according 
to which to learn the meaning of an expression and to be competent 
about its use is to be able to use that expression insofar as that expres-
sion is governed by a semantic norm (or by a semantic property with 
a normative import). Such a semantic theory could hardly have any 
theoretical interest for an overall theory of language use and linguis-
tic behaviour. I shall elaborate on this point.
Cappelen and Lepore argue that the felt inability to truth evalu-
ate a simple sentence like ‘Bradley is tall’ offers no positive evidence 
against the view that the property of being tall simpliciter exists and 
11 It is not the aim of this paper to defend contextualism about this or that 
expression. If one says to have the intuition that the sentences ‘Bradley is tall’ and 
‘the leaves are green’ have determinate truth conditions independently of contex-
tual information, that is fine to me with regard to the purpose of this paper and I 
will not argue to the contrary. The aim of this paper is to defend incompleteness 
arguments from Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism. One might change the exam-
ples I discuss with others involving different sentences. Notice that Cappelen and 
Lepore do not question the premise that speakers are not able to evaluate certain 
sentences independently of contextual information. Thus, the reader is free to 
choose one of those sentences. Cappelen and Lepore grant that premise but argue 
that incompleteness arguments are illegitimate because they conflate premises 
that register psychological data with metaphysical conclusions. I argue that the 
conclusions of incompleteness arguments are not metaphysical at all.
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is the semantic content of the adjective ‘tall’. On the one hand, Cap-
pelen and Lepore acknowledge that the question of giving an analysis 
of the property of being tall simpliciter or an account of what makes 
something tall simpliciter is a difficult problem, but one for meta-
physicians, not for semanticists. On the other hand, Cappelen and 
Lepore (2005: 164) hold that semanticists have no difficulty at all to 
say which proposition the simple sentence ‘Bradley is tall’ expresses: 
it is the proposition that Bradley is tall. Nor have semanticists any dif-
ficulty to tell the truth conditions of the simple sentence ‘Bradley is 
tall’: ‘Bradley is tall’ is true if and only if Bradley is tall.
I claim that Cappelen and Lepore’s confidence in disquotational 
truth conditions betrays their underestimation of Incompleteness 
Arguments. A semantic theory for a language L aims to capture the 
semantic properties of the expressions of L. The point, which is rel-
evant to our discussion, is that a semantic theory must be related 
to linguistic competence. This is so not only for those philosophers 
who hold that a semantic theory is a theoretical representation of 
the implicit knowledge of the language, which competent speakers 
possess. It is so also for those philosophers who reject the view that 
a semantic theory is a theoretical representation of what competent 
speakers implicitly know.12 Indeed, a semantic theory for L cannot 
be fully assessed in isolation from questions related to how L-ex-
pressions are bestowed with their semantic properties and to what 
L-speakers typically do, whenever they are regarded as competent in 
the use of L, especially questions as to whether the linguistic abilities 
they manifest count as governed by semantic normative principles. 
12 See, for example, Devitt 1981: 93: ‘What need explaining, basically, are the 
verbal parts of human behaviour. In explaining these, we must attribute certain 
properties (for example, being true and referring to Socrates) to the sounds and 
inscriptions produced, and certain other properties (for example, understanding 
“Socrates”) to the people who produce those sounds and inscriptions.’ See also 
Devitt 1999: 169: ‘Linguistic competence is a mental state of a person, posited 
to explain his linguistic behaviour; it plays a key role—although not, of course, 
the only role—in the production of that behaviour. Linguistic symbols are the 
result of that behaviour; they are the products of the competence, its outputs... 
A theory of a part of the production of linguistic symbols is not a theory of the 
products, the symbols themselves. Of course, given the causal relation between 
competence and symbols we can expect a theory of the one to bear on a theory of 
the other. But that does not make the two theories identical.’
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Suppose a semantic theory for, say, English contains a disquotational 
principle like the following, which arguably captures what Cappelen 
and Lepore have in mind, when they say that the semantic content of 
‘tall’ is the property of being tall simpliciter and that semanticists have 
not difficulty at all to tell the truth conditions of ‘Bradley is tall’ and 
which proposition it expresses:
(A) For any object o, ‘tall’ applies in English to o if and only if o 
is tall.
The point I want to stress is that it is theoretically significant for that 
semantic theory that an account is available about how the linguistic 
abilities of competent speakers count as governed by the principle 
(A). It is also theoretically significant that an account is available 
about how it comes that the word ‘tall’ has the semantic property 
of applying to all and only tall simpliciter objects. If there is evidence 
that no account of that kind is available, then there is evidence that 
the semantic theory in question is on a wrong track. As Michael De-
vitt (2007: 52) says, semantic contents are not “God given”, but as 
conventions need to be established and sustained by regular uses. 
Words cannot have the semantic contents they have independently 
of the linguistic behaviour of competent speakers. Otherwise, it is 
impossible to explain how words get associated with their semantic 
properties and how such associations are learned (and transmitted) 
by being exposed to the linguistic practice. Moreover, a semantic 
theory that does not enable us to describe the linguistic behaviour as 
subject to semantic principles with a normative import is scarcely of 
any interest for an overall account of language use.
I claim that the gist of Incompleteness Arguments is not that cer-
tain entities, such as the property of being tall simpliciter, do not ex-
ist. Rather, it is that such entities, if any, cannot be the semantic 
contents of words. A semantic theory that assigned such entities to 
words, as their semantic contents, would be incompatible with any 
plausible account of language learning and language understanding, 
according to which by learning and understanding a language, we 
learn and understand expressions as governed by semantic principles 
with normative import.
Consider one of Travis’ (1997) favourite examples. A speaker ut-
ters the sentence (3):
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(3) The leaves are green.
speaking of a Japanese maple, whose leaves are naturally russet but 
have been repainted green. In a context of utterance in which the 
speaker talks with a photographer, who looks for a green subject, 
the speaker is taken to tell the truth. In another context of utterance 
in which the speaker talks with a botanist, who is interested in the 
natural colour of the plant, the speaker is not taken to tell the truth. 
The point that an incompleteness argument brings out is that com-
petent speakers feel unable to truth evaluate utterances of the sen-
tence (3) independently of the information available in the context 
of utterance. This result means that the linguistic abilities that are 
required for the mastery of the word ‘green’ cannot be construed as 
governed by the semantic norm expressed by the following disquo-
tational principle:
(B) For any object o, ‘green’ applies in English to o if and only if 
o is green.
The reason why linguistic competence cannot be so construed is that 
the linguistic practice cannot be guided by such principle. As a mat-
ter of fact, the principle (B) states conditions of the application for 
‘green’ that competent speakers are never able to track, as testified 
by their felt inability to truth evaluate sentences such as (3) indepen-
dently of contextual information. To put it another way, the prin-
ciple (B) specifies the semantic content of the word ‘green’. Hence, 
the principle (B) states a norm about the use of ‘green’: it is correct 
to apply ‘green’ to all and only green simpliciter objects. Incomplete-
ness Arguments show that the norm that the principle (B) states is 
not applicable, because nobody in the linguistic community is able to 
tell when it applies and when it does not. Since norms must be ap-
plicable, the conclusion follows that the principle (B) states no norms 
at all and, therefore, cannot be a semantic principle. The principle 
(B) does not play the normative role that is constitutive of semantic 
principles.
The consequence of Cappelen and Lepore’s view is more radical 
and damaging than the view held by externalists such as Putnam 
(1975). Externalists hold that semantic properties are objective in 
the sense that words have their semantic properties independently 
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of explicit knowledge and discriminating abilities, which speakers 
or the linguistic community as a whole possess. In 1750, ‘water’ in 
Twin Earthian English referred to XYZ even though nobody knew 
the chemical composition of the liquid stuff on Twin Earth and no-
body could discriminate XYZ from H2O. Externalism has the conse-
quence that semantic norms might elude even the most expert speak-
ers of the community. In 1750, nobody could have been in a position 
to correct an application of the Twin Earthian word ‘water’ to H2O. 
Had a Twin Earthian speaker talked to an Earthian speaker, they 
would have misunderstood each other, one speaking of XYZ and the 
other of H2O. As Marconi (1997: 88) remarks, that would be a mis-
understanding of a very peculiar kind, since nobody in the linguistic 
community could have pointed it out.
It is not my interest here to take side with externalists and de-
fend their view from Marconi’s criticism. Rather, my interest is to 
highlight the difference between externalism and the radical posi-
tion that issues from Cappelen and Lepore’s view. Externalists hold 
that semantic properties are unaffected by explicit knowledge and 
discriminating abilities. Semantic properties are determined by cer-
tain factual, causal connections to the world. Externalists, however, 
do have an account of how words are bestowed with their seman-
tic properties, which rests on baptismal ceremonies and, above all, 
multiple groundings. A word has the reference it has because most 
significant referential practices, as a matter of fact, are related to that 
reference. This means that there are favourable—contextually fa-
vourable, not epistemically or cognitively favourable—circumstanc-
es in which Twin Earthian competent speakers believe, and believe it 
truly, that the conditions for the application of ‘water’ are satisfied. 
This confers the following principle:
(C) ‘water’ refers in Twin Earthian English to XYZ.
its normative role, although it might elude even the most expert 
speakers in the whole community, when they are not in a contextual 
favourable position (say an expert Twin Earthian speaker has been 
transported to Earth). Therefore, there are favourable circumstanc-
es in which Twin Earthian competent speakers are disposed to truly 
assent to the sentence ‘that is water’ and to correctly truth evaluate 
other sentences containing the word ‘water’.
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Incompleteness Arguments show that competent speakers are 
never disposed to truth evaluate sentences containing certain words 
independently of contextual information. For example, there are no 
circumstances in which competent speakers are disposed to truth eval-
uate ‘Bradley is tall’ independently of contextual information. This 
means that competent speakers are never able to track instances of 
the property of being tall simpliciter. This fact prevents any semantic 
theory from ascribing the property of being tall simpliciter to the adjec-
tive ‘tall’ as its semantic content by means of the principle (A), because 
competent speakers are never able to tell when the conditions for the 
application of ‘tall’, as captured by the principle (A), are satisfied. Such 
semantics is not compatible with any account of how the adjective ‘tall’ 
is bestowed with its semantic property and of how such semantic prop-
erty exerts a normative role over the linguistic practice.
5 Cappelen and Lepore’s charge of verificationism
Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 164-5) take into consideration this 
form of resistance to their rejection of Incompleteness Arguments. 
They respond that semantics is not in the business of telling what the 
world is like. Therefore, semantics is not in the business of telling 
whether, say, the utterance of the sentence ‘Uma Thurman has red 
eyes’ is true or not. The fact that a semantic theory for a language 
L does not instruct L-speakers to ascertain the truth value of L-sen-
tences is not a defect of the semantic theory. Cappelen and Lepore 
remind us that it is trivial that a proposition with a determinate truth 
value is expressed by a felicitous utterance of the sentence ‘100,000 
years ago an insect moved over this spot’, although we have no idea 
whether it is true or not and no idea how to find out whether it is 
true or not. Thinking otherwise, they say, would be to indulge in 
verificationism.
I find Cappelen and Lepore’s response mistaken. The accusation 
of verificationism misses the target of our discussion. I agree that 
theorists, who do not adhere to verificationism, do not identify the 
knowledge of the proposition expressed by the utterance of a sen-
tence with the knowledge of a method for its verification. Theorists, 
who are not verificationists, agree that competent speakers fully un-
derstand the proposition expressed by the utterance of the sentence 
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‘100,000 years ago an insect moved over this spot’ without being 
in a position to verify whether it is true or not. On the other hand, 
also theorists who are not verificationists cannot ignore questions as 
to how that sentence got the content it has and what linguistic abili-
ties distinguish people who understand it from people who do not. 
Notice that I am not claiming that it is a task for semantics to find out 
answers to those questions. My claim is that a semantic theory must 
be compatible with an account that provides such answers.
A theorist, who is not a verificationist nor a semantic antireal-
ist and takes the sentence ‘100,000 years ago an insect moved over 
this spot’ to depict an epistemically inaccessible state of affairs, will 
not hold that the understanding of such sentence is manifested by 
the capacity to tell whether its truth conditions are satisfied or not. 
Nor can the understanding of the sentence ‘100,000 years ago an 
insect moved over this spot’ be traced back to the ability to explicitly 
formulate the disquotational truth-condition ‘100,000 years ago an 
insect moved over this spot’ is true if and only if 100,000 years ago an insect 
moved over this spot (over the demonstrated spot), for the simple reason 
that many competent speakers are not able to do so. One option left 
is to say that a criterion for understanding is that one understands 
the sentence ‘100,000 years ago an insect moved over this spot’ only 
if one understands the single expressions that form the sentence and 
the syntactic structure of the sentence. The question arises as to how 
the understanding of the single expressions is manifested.
It has been argued13 that linguistic competence has two compo-
nents, one inferential and the other referential. The inferential com-
ponent consists in the ability to manage a network of connections 
among words. For example, we recognize as competent speakers 
those people who manifest the disposition to make the inference 
from, say, ‘A is an insect’ to ‘A is an animal’, or are able to give a 
definition of ‘insect’, or are able to find a synonym for ‘insect’, or 
are able to retrieve the word ‘insect’ from its definition, etc. The 
referential component consists in the ability to map words to the 
world. For example, the disposition to give the assent to the sentence 
‘that is an insect’ in presence of an insect or the ability to correctly 
obey an order such as ‘point at an insect’. This account of linguistic 
13 See Marconi 1997.
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competence together with the assumption, arguably shared, that the 
competence in the use of the expression ‘insect’ requires both refer-
ential and inferential abilities demands that the following principle:
(D) For any object o, ‘insect’ applies in English to o if and only if 
o is an insect.
assign the expression ‘insect’ a kind as its semantic content such that 
there must be circumstances, at least in favourable contextual condi-
tions, in which competent speakers believe—and believe it truly—
that it is instantiated. Otherwise, no matter what the linguistic com-
petence in the use of the word ‘insect’ turns out to be, it is detached 
from the normative role of the principle (D). The result is that one 
gets a semantics that is useless for an overall theory of language use, 
since it prevents us from accounting for the linguistic practice as 
governed by semantic principles with normative roles.
This is the constraint that a theory of linguistic competence poses 
on semantics: the linguistic practice in the use of a language L needs 
to be taken as the manifestation of the understanding of L-expres-
sions as governed by semantic principles with normative roles. The 
point of Incompleteness Arguments is that a semantic theory, which 
employs principles such as (A) and (B), violates such constraint. In-
completeness Arguments start with the premise that speakers are 
never able to believe that the property of being tall simpliciter or the 
property of being green simpliciter are instantiated, i.e. that the con-
ditions for the correct application of ‘tall’ and ‘green’, as captured by 
the principles (A) and (B), are satisfied, because competent speakers 
have no beliefs about the truth value of simple sentences like ‘Bradley 
is tall’ or ‘the leaves are green’ independently of contextual infor-
mation. Hence, the linguistic practice of competent speakers shows 
that their understanding of ‘tall’ and ‘green’ is not governed by the 
principles (A) and (B).
Analogous considerations show that learning the mastery of ‘tall’ 
and ‘green’ cannot amount to learning the meaning of words as 
governed by the principles (A) and (B). Arguably, we pick up the 
meaning of expressions, like ‘tall’ and ‘green’, by being exposed to 
assertions of simple sentences, like ‘Bradley is tall’ and ‘the leaves 
are green’. Incompleteness Arguments show that assertions of simple 
sentences, such as ‘Bradley is tall’ and ‘the leaves are green’, cannot 
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be the expression of the belief that Bradley is tall simpliciter and the 
leaves are green simpliciter, i.e. the belief that the conditions for the 
application of ‘tall’ and ‘green’, as captured by the principles (A) and 
(B), to Bradley and to the leaves are satisfied. As a matter of fact, 
competent speakers have no beliefs about the truth value of those 
sentences independently of contextual information. If the assertions 
of simple sentences like ‘Bradley is tall’ and ‘the leaves are green’ are 
not the expression of the belief that the conditions for the applica-
tion of ‘tall’ and ‘green’, as captured by the principles (A) and (B), to 
Bradley and to the leaves are satisfied, whatever one learns through 
the exposure to assertions of that kind is not a mastery of words as 
governed by semantic norms expressed by the principles (A) and (B).
6 Two final clarifications
The premise of an incompleteness argument registers the fact that if 
speakers do not take into account the contextual information, they 
have no beliefs about the truth value of sentences such as ‘the leaves 
are green’. I argued that an incompleteness argument moves from 
that premise to the conclusion that the property of being green sim-
pliciter, if any, cannot be the semantic content of the adjective ‘green’. 
The point is semantic, not metaphysical. If speakers do not have any 
beliefs about when the property of being green simpliciter applies to 
objects, then they do not have any beliefs about when the conditions 
for the application of ‘green’, as captured by the axiom (B), are satis-
fied. This fact makes such axiom normatively idle.
One might raise the following objection. It might well be that 
speakers have beliefs about the truth value of sentences such as ‘the 
leaves are green’ only if they take into account the contextual infor-
mation. However, this does not entail that the adjective ‘green’ has 
no invariant semantic content, i.e. a semantic content that is inde-
pendent of context. One might say that whenever a speaker believes 
that the sentence ‘the leaves are green’ is true taking into account the 
contextual information, the speaker ipso facto believes that the condi-
tion for being green simpliciter are satisfied, and thereby the speaker 
believes that the condition for the application of ‘green’, as captured 
by the axiom (B), are satisfied.
An objection like this one is the obvious consequence of combining 
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the minimalist view in semantics with a modest metaphysical ac-
count of the property of being green simpliciter. The axiom (B)
(B) For any object o, ‘green’ applies in English to o if and only if o 
is green (simpliciter)
is combined with the following modest account of what it takes to be 
green simpliciter:
For any object o, o is green simpliciter if and only if o looks green 
on some surface under some circumstances.
Cappelen and Lepore do not explicitly defend such metaphysical 
view. They coherently refuse to be committed to it because a de-
fense of any metaphysical theory is homework for metaphysicians 
and not for philosophers of language. However, they confess their 
sympathy to it when they respond to the following objection. Let 
us assume that ‘the leaves are green’ is true if and only if the leaves 
are green on some surface under some circumstances. Doesn’t that 
make it very, indeed, too easy to be green? Doesn’t that make, say, 
the White House green? Cappelen and Lepore respond that when 
we think hard about what it is to be green, maybe that is all it takes 
to be green. If so, then it would turn out that it is not so hard to be 
green. Cappelen and Lepore say that whether one finds this picture 
congenial or not it is not a problem that arises because of views one 
might hold about the context sensitivity of ‘green’.
Thus, Cappelen and Lepore’s response is that the above objection 
confuses a metaphysical issue with a semantic one. My counter-reply 
is that the above objection has a semantic reading. If what it takes 
to be green simpliciter is to look green on some surface under some 
circumstances, then any object o is green simpliciter. It follows that 
any sentence of the form ‘O is green’ is trivially true (granted the 
existence of O). Now, this picture is not in line with the normativ-
ity of semantic principles. An axiom such as (B) turns out to state 
conditions for the application of ‘green’ that are always trivially sat-
isfied, because it is trivially true that anything looks green on some 
surface under some circumstances. This contrasts with the idea that 
when we learn the meaning of ‘green’ we learn a rule that tells us 
the circumstances in which it is correct to apply it apart from the 
circumstances in which it is not. Indeed, a consequence of semantic 
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minimalism combined with the above modest metaphysical view is 
not only that it is a trivial truth that any object is green, but also that 
it is a trivial truth that any object is green and red and blue and so 
forth for any color. In conclusion, this picture, which combines se-
mantic minimalism with the modest metaphysical view, deprives the 
axiom (B) of its normative import, and I argued that this is a flaw in 
the field of semantics, not in the field of metaphysics.
The very same problem about normativity does not affect Con-
textualism in semantics, or at least some of its versions. Suppose a 
contextualist theory says that ‘green’ is a context dependent expres-
sion and its meaning is given by the rule that ‘green’ must be applied 
to an object with respect to some contextually relevant surface un-
der some contextually relevant circumstances. Of course, selected a 
surface and certain circumstances in a context, it is correct to apply 
‘green’ to an object if and only if that object looks green on that sur-
face under those circumstances. It is not a trivial truth that an object 
is green in this sense. For example, it is not a trivial truth that the 
leaves of the Japanese maple in the photographer’s studio have been 
painted green.
I dedicate a final reflection on the argument for the existence of 
invariant contents that says that although they do not fit speakers’ 
intuitive judgments about the truth conditional content of assertions 
in contexts, they nevertheless play an indispensable role in commu-
nication and, contrary to what some contextualists hold, they are 
psychologically real.
Cappelen and Lepore maintain that invariant semantic contents 
play a function in the cognitive life of communicators that no other 
content can play.14 The idea is that invariant contents have a role to 
play as fallback content, i.e. the content which is guaranteed to be re-
coverable in a communicative exchange when something goes wrong 
due to the fact that either the speaker or the hearer or both have an 
imperfect, partial, limited, erroneous grasp of the contextual infor-
mation. The invariant content is that content the speaker (the audi-
ence) can expect the audience (the speaker) to grasp (and expect the 
audience (the speaker) to expect the speaker (the audience) to expect 
them to grasp) even if they have mistaken or incomplete contextual 
14 See also Borg 2007, 2009 and 2012.
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information. Cappelen and Lepore say that the invariant content is 
our defense against confusion, misunderstanding and mistakes. Even 
if the invariant content is trivially true, as in the case of an object be-
ing green on some surface under some circumstances, nonetheless it 
is a starting point from which the content that the speaker intended 
to communicate can be recovered. Therefore, the invariant contents 
are psychologically real.
My reply is that this argument is a non sequitur. The conclusion 
that certain expressions are not context dependent and have an in-
variant semantic content does not follow from the premise that in-
variant contents play an important role in communication. Consider 
the expression ‘I’. Nobody will put in question that ‘I’ is a context 
dependent expression. ‘I’ is an indexical which Cappelen and Lepore 
put into the basic set of context dependent expressions. Suppose one 
overhears the utterance of the sentence ‘I have headache’ coming 
from the next room without having access to the contextual infor-
mation, i.e. without knowing who is the speaker of the utterance. 
This is a case in which something goes wrong due to the fact that 
one has an imperfect grasp of the contextual information. Nonethe-
less, there is a content that one can understand in virtue of being a 
competent speaker. One understands that the speaker of that utter-
ance has headache. That there is a unique speaker of that utterance 
who suffers from headache is a content that one can grasp even if one 
does not know who is the speaker, and therefore one cannot grasp 
what the speaker said, i.e. the semantic content of that utterance. The 
recovered content might play an important role. One can enter the 
next room and ask who uttered the sentence ‘I have headache’ in or-
der to discover who is the speaker, and hence in order to understand 
the content that the speaker semantically expressed. Although there 
is an invariant content that one can grasp in virtue of being a com-
petent speaker, it does not follow that the expression ‘I’ is not con-
text dependent. In general, as far as indexicals and demonstratives 
are concerned, competent speakers can recover invariant contents 
from their characters, and such contents can play an important role 
in communication. Of course, it does not follow that indexicals and 
demonstratives are not context dependent expressions.
Consider now a contextualist theory that says that ‘green’ is a 
context dependent expression with the rule that ‘green’ applies to 
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an object with respect to a contextually relevant surface under some 
contextually relevant circumstances. Suppose one overhears an ut-
terance of the sentence ‘that is green’ coming from the photogra-
pher’s studio without having access to the studio. In virtue of being 
a competent speaker, one knows that what the speaker said is true if 
and only if there is a contextually relevant object that has a contextu-
ally relevant surface looking green under some contextually relevant 
circumstances. This is not what the speaker said. The speaker se-
mantically expressed the proposition that that Japanese maple has 
the leaves repainted green. Although one cannot grasp such propo-
sition, which is the semantic content of the assertion, the recovered 
content one understands is a starting point that might lead to grasp 
the semantic content.
Thus, my conclusion is that no doubt there are invariant contents 
that can be associated with certain expressions in virtue of being 
recoverable from our knowledge of their meaning. No doubt such 
contents are psychologically real and might play important roles in 
communication. However, it does not follow that those expressions 
are not context dependent.
7 Conclusions
I argued that the conclusions of Incompleteness Arguments are not 
that certain entities do not exist. Those are metaphysical questions 
that metaphysicians are called to answer. Contrary to Cappelen and 
Lepore’s view, and no matter what metaphysicians are willing to say, 
Incompleteness Arguments show that even if one acknowledges the 
existence of certain entities, e.g. the property of being tall simpliciter 
and the property of being green simpliciter, such entities cannot be 
the contents that a semantic theory associates with words, because a 
semantic theory so construed is incompatible with theoretical con-
siderations about language learning and language understanding.
One can agree with Cappelen and Lepore on keeping issues in 
metaphysics apart from issues in the philosophy of language and on 
rejecting Dummett’s thesis (I). One can also agree with Cappelen 
and Lepore on rejecting Dummett’s thesis (II) and its constitutive 
constraint that the linguistic competence must constitute the implicit 
knowledge of semantics, which, in Dummett’s view, is the premise 
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that leads to semantic antirealism. However, one cannot go too far, 
as Cappelen and Lepore go, in detaching semantics from linguistic 
competence. There is a constraint that a theory of linguistic compe-
tence poses on semantics: the linguistic practice needs to be taken as 
the manifestation of the understanding of words and as the basis for 
the learning of their meaning insofar as they are words governed by 
semantic principles with normative import. If certain semantic prin-
ciples are not suitable for such an account of linguistic competence, 
then any semantic theory that endorses them is on the wrong track. I 
take this result, which points at an intimate connection between lin-
guistic competence and semantics, to be an important part of Dum-
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